Abstract In unattended wireless sensor networks (UWSNs), sensed data are stored locally or at designated nodes and further accessed by authorized collectors on demand. This paradigm is motivated by certain scenarios where historical or digest data (e.g., average temperature in a day), instead of real-time data, are of interest. The data are not instantly forwarded to a central sink upon sensing, thereby saving communication energy for transmission. Such a paradigm can also improve data survivability by making use of distributed data storage in cheap flash memory on nodes. However, the security and dependability of such data storage are critical for the future data accessibility in UWSNs. To address this issue, we propose a secure and dependable distributed storage scheme for UWSNs. Our scheme takes advantages of both secret sharing and Reed-Solomon code, which can achieve computational security and maintain low communication overhead in terms of shortened data dispersing size. We also propose a general coding method to publicly verify data integrity in a distributed manner, with low communication and storage overhead, and without the need of holding original data. The extensive analysis justifies that our scheme can provide secure, dependable and publicly verifiable distributed data storage in UWSNs even in the presence of node compromise and Byzantine failure.
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of a large number of sensor nodes that can be easily deployed to various environments. The sensor nodes usually generate a large amount of data over their lifetime to report or record the environmental context. Data storage in WSNs mainly falls into two categories, namely centralized data storage and distributed data storage [1] . In the former case, data are sensed, processed, aggregated and managed at a central location, usually a sink. In the latter case, after a sensor node has generated some data, the node stores the data locally or at some designated nodes within the network, instead of immediately forwarding the data to a centralized location out of the network [2] [3] [4] . Such a paradigm is called "Unattended WSNs" (UWSNs) [2] . UWSNs paradigm is motivated by scenarios whereby not real-time information, but digest information is of interest. The digest information includes historical summarization or locally extracted results on data processing, such as the average temperature during last three months; the highest and lowest humidity degree during last 24 h; or more specifically, the average concentration of a chemical element in soil during last half year [5] . The digest information is provided on demand upon user's retrieval, avoiding frequent data transmission to sinks. It thus remarkably saves the communication energy. Moreover, there exist some scenarios that may not be convenient for deploying robust real-time sinks, e.g. in the sea, volcano, or places far away from collectors. The data have to be stored locally or in designated nodes in the network and wait for further collection.
Security and dependability of the stored data in UWSNs are of paramount importance for their functionality. The reasons are listed as follows: 1) As sensor nodes are exposed to unattended environment, data may be lost due to failure of sensor nodes, such as power depletion, melting, corroding or getting smashed; 2) data may be stolen or modified by mobile adversaries [6] that can compromise a selective subset of sensor nodes. Hence, a fault-tolerant and compromise-resilient scheme for distributed data storage has to be in position to ensure data availability, integrity and confidentiality.
The straightforward data redundancy or fault-tolerant methods for data availability cannot be applied in UWSNs domain that has resource constraints. Besides, a naive way to check the data integrity of distributed data by hash value is also not appropriate. More precisely, the hash values of the distributed data are stored at an integrity checker or verifier, and the checker sends requests to data holders to launch a check. If the computed hash values of returned data do not match stored hash values, the data are modified, thus obviously incurring high communication overhead due to the overwhelming data communications. It also induces remarkable storage overhead as the checker has to store a large volume of hash values. Especially, such a checking method is not reliable as the checker is a single point of failure. Hence, a lightweight method for data integrity check with distributed public verification is mandatory.
Currently, UWSNs paradigm, especially its security issues attract more and more attentions in research communities [2-5, 7, 8] . Nevertheless, security, dependability, and integrity verifiability of distributed data storage still require thorough exploration and tailored design.
Objective of the paper: The goal of this paper is to investigate techniques for achieving the secure and dependable distributed data storage as well as lightweight and public verifiability of integrity for UWSNs.
Contributions: 1) In this paper, we propose a secure and dependable data distributed storage scheme by making use of secret sharing and Reed-Solomon code. Such a scheme is resilient for random fault and node compromise, with communication and storage efficiency maintained. 2) We present a generic technique called two granularity linear code (TGLC), which can verify distributed data's integrity publicly and efficiently, i.e., in a distributed manner and with low communication and storage overhead without original data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The network assumption, adversary model and design goals are presented in section 2. Section 3 presents some preliminaries on secret sharing and error correcting code. Section 4 proposes the data storage scheme. The extensive performance analyzes and security analysis are given in section 5. Section 6 proposes a lightweight coding method for public verifiability of data integrity. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.
Problem formulation

Network assumptions
We consider a sensor network that is composed of a large number of sensor nodes with unique ID, and many users or collectors can access the data in the network on demand. Following the previous works on distributed storage in WSNs (e.g. Unattended WSNs [2, 7] , Storage-Centric WSNs [3] , Data Centric WSNs [9] , In-Situ Data Storage WSNs [5] , etc.), we assume that each sensor node has certain capacity to store data. (The Gigabyte memory for sensor node is already available [10, 11] .) Once the sensing data are generated at sensor nodes, they will be stored locally for future retrieval. The stored data will be accessed by authorized users, instead of sensor nodes, e.g., the soldiers with laptop in a battlefield. The collected data may also be further processed together at in-door workstations or powerful hand held devices that have no computational constraints. We assume that the pairwise shared key between any two nodes can be established easily, e.g., by employing the key establishment scheme [12] .
Attack model
The UWSNs impose some attacks in many ways. In this paper, we focus on the attackers who attempt to eavesdrop, physically corrupt, modify, and capture the stored data in networks. The attackers thus have the following capabilities:
(1) The attackers can eavesdrop on all the traffics in UWSNs.
(2) The attackers may randomly select some sensor nodes to physically corrupt them (such as smash, melt or corrode), or sensor nodes fail due to power depletion. In this occasion, the nodes totally lose the functionality.
(3) The attackers can compromise some sensor nodes, and then modify the data stored in the nodes. This type of attacker can further be categorized into two classes: 1) The adversary compromises the node to pry or modify some data and then leave.
2) The adversary compromises the node and comes back periodically or occasionally for some purposes. The left type is the most advanced adversary who resides at compromised nodes for a long term, which acts normally in data storage stage but malfunctions at data submission stage. They can be easily detected upon data retrieval and thus are out of the scope of this paper.
Design goal
Our design goal is to provide the security and dependability of data storage in the presence of aforementioned attacks. We focus on the security in terms of data confidentiality and integrity, and the dependability in the sense of the tolerance of random fault and the resilience of security compromise. That is, if a random fault occurs, the data still can be recovered by the user upon request, and data confidentiality and integrity are retained. Also, if some nodes are compromised, the data modification is still detectable and data secrecy is still protected. Meanwhile, to defend the eavesdropping attack, data have to be encrypted in transmission.
Evaluation metrics
The basic security requirements are satisfied as follows: 1) Data confidentiality. Data are encrypted and only authenticated users can access it. 2) Data integrity. If data are modified by attackers, they can be detected by users. 3) Data availability. The stored in-networking sensed data can be retrieved correctly upon request.
The performance evaluation includes the storage, communication, and computation consumption. The dependability is evaluated in two folders: 1) Compromise resilience. Provided that some nodes are compromised by attackers, data integrity and confidentiality can be achieved. 2) Fault tolerance. In the case of the random faults in the data, the original data can be recovered by the authenticated users.
The energy consuming has three parts: communication, storage and computation. Communication costs much more energy than storage. For example, transmitting data over radio channel consume 200 times more energy than storing the same amount of data locally on a sensor node [13] . Radio reception costs 500 times more energy than reading the same amount of data from local storage [10] . Computation cost depends on the calculation involved. Simple arithmetic operations such as addition or multiplication may have relatively low cost due to the powerful processor in the new generation sensor node [14, 15] . Therefore, we pay more attention to the communication cost.
Preliminary
Secret sharing
Shamir [16] proposed an (m, n) secret sharing scheme based on polynomial interpolation, in which m of n shares are required to reconstruct the secret.
Shamir's secret sharing: The secret k is in Z p (p is prime, and p > n). Each shareholder i is in the set P (|P | = n). All mathematical operations are in the Finite Field Z p . To distribute k, select a polynomial a(x) with degree m − 1 and constant term k. Generate a share s i for each i in P with a(x):
all i in authorized subset B of P (|B| = m) and use the pairs in the Lagrange interpolation formula:
Reed-Solomon codes
A (k, n) erasure code encodes a block of data into n fragments, which has 1/k size of the original block, so that any k can be used to reconstruct the original block. An example of such erasure coding schemes is Reed-Solomon codes [17] . 
Proposed data storage scheme
In this section, we propose a family of schemes for secure and dependable data storage.
Notation
Suppose there are x sensor nodes in UWSNs. They are formulated as an undirected graph G(V, E). The node set is V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v x } and the edge set is E = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e y }. The node is denoted by v i (1 i x). The node v i has d i neighbors, which compose a set SET i . The distributed data may be called Shares, to distinguish it from the original sensed data.
We list some major notations used in following sections in Table 1 .
Basic setting
After sensor node v i senses data Data i , the listed steps begin to protect the data integrity and data confidentiality if the data are stored individually and locally:
(1) Generate a random session key RSK. (4) Encrypt random session key RSK using symmetric key between sensor v i and user u, or public key of a user u. Both are possible, depending on the underlying key management scheme, which is independent of our work. Because the public key does not concern the node compromising, and public key system is already possible in sensor networks, we assume the public key is used hereby, which is denoted by P K u . We denote the encryption of random session key RSK by {RSK} P Ku .
Therefore, the sensed data are equipped with the protection of data integrity and data confidentiality. Data i is equipped into DT a i = {{Data i M AC} RSK {RSK} P Ku }. Only authorized users can decrypt out RSK using corresponding private key upon receiving DT a i , and then decrypt out the original data, and check data integrity through hash value.
Replication based scheme (RepS)
It is known that to store the data individually is not dependable. If the node is compromised or physically attacked, all data in the node will be lost. One way to improve the dependability is thus to replicate the data and distribute the replicas to the neighbors. If some nodes are compromised or physically attacked, the data can still be retrieved from the other nodes that store the replica. We thus present a replication based scheme (RepS) for distributed data storage as a baseline. Scheme: v i randomly selects n nodes in SET i . For each node (e.g. v j ), v i distributes one replica of data S t = DT a i . To differentiate the data, the packet includes the v i and seqno.
The user collects data DT a i from any one of n nodes that store the replica, decrypts it, and verifies the data integrity.
Analysis: Compared with individual storage, RepS does not improve the security but improve the dependability on fault tolerance. However, it induces much communication and storage overhead. More preciously, for n-replica scheme, the communication and storage overhead are both |DT a i | * n.
Secret sharing based scheme (SSBS)
We observe that performance and dependability of RepS scheme can be further improved. For example, it is desirable to avoid the public key encryption operations in RepS (and in individual storage). Moreover, RepS is not dependable if a user is compromised or corresponding private key is exposed, attackers who capture only one replica can reveal the original sensed data. In contrast, secret sharing scheme can encode the sensed data into many shares to protect the confidentiality without inducing any encryption operation. Moreover, even if one user is compromised, the sensed data still cannot be revealed if the number of captured shares is less than a threshold value. Hence, to further improve the dependability of data storage with compromise resilience, we propose SSBS scheme (secret sharing based distributed data storage).
Scheme:
(2) v i randomly selects n, (n < |SET i |) neighbors in SET i , e.g. v j ∈ SET i , and distributes one randomly selected distinct share to v j by using pairwise secret key K i,j to encrypt the packet.
The user collects m shares in the nodes, reconstructs the DT b i using Lagrange interpolation, decrypts it and checks data integrity.
Example: Suppose DT b i has 2 bytes and uses (6, 8) Analysis: SSBS improves the performance and dependability of RepS due to the properties of secret sharing. Secret sharing can provide perfect confidentiality of the secret in the sense of informationtheoretical security. For (m, n) secret sharing, any shares less than m have completely uncertainty about the secret (i.e., DT b i ). Therefore, even if more than one node is compromised, the attacker still cannot reveal the data without enough shares.
In scheme SSBS, the length of distributed data shares is always shorter than that in RepS, as RSK is always shorter than {RSK} P Ku . However, it confronts the same undesirable storage and communication overhead because in both RepS and SSBS, the distributed share size equals original data size (namely DT a i or DT b i ). Moreover, the decreased computational overhead is public key encryption. The additional overhead is computation overhead for secrete sharing, which has O(n * m) modular exponential operations, and data encryption for transmission. The computational cost of the data reconstruction from shares is omitted since the authorized users can reconstruct the data at workstation which is supposed to have no computational constraints, as pointed out in network assumption section.
Lou [18] proposed a multi-path routing based on threshold secret sharing scheme to provide data confidentiality without encryption for mobile ad hoc networks. It uses the same technique as SSBS for confidentiality, but later we will show that such a scheme can be further improved by inducing ReedSolomon code.
Advanced hybrid scheme (HybridS)
To further improve storage and communication efficiency of SSBS scheme without loss of security and dependability, we notice that erasure code can reduce space and bandwidth overheads of redundancy in fault-tolerant data storage [19, 20] . We thus propose HybridS -a scheme based on secret sharing and erasure coding, which takes the advantages of both erasure code and secret sharing.
Parameter setup: Select n neighbors to distribute shares. To reconstruct data, m shares are required. Let γ * n = m, where γ is a security parameter (e.g., 0.5 ∼ 0.8). If γ is larger, a higher percentage of shares is required for the reconstruction of the data. Recall that
Share generation:
(1) v i employs (m, n) secret sharing scheme to encode RSK into n shares, denoted by S 1 , . . . , S n . (2) v i employs (m, n) Reed-Solomon coding scheme to encode E into n shares. We denote the shares by S 1 , . . . , S n . More specifically, v i divides E into m parts, and selects
. . , n).
Share distribution: v i randomly selects n neighbors in SET i (e.g. v j ), and distributes one randomly selected distinct share S t and S t , t ∈ [1, n] to v j by using pairwise secret key K i,j to encrypt the packet.
Data reconstruction: The user collects m shares in nodes and reconstructs RSK and E, and then reconstructs {DT b i } using Lagrange interpolation, decrypts the data, and checks data integrity.
Example: We give a trivial example to explain the main idea in above procedures. Node v i distributes DT b i = {E RSK} using (6,8) scheme. Suppose E has 12 bytes and RSK has 2 bytes. Use (6, 8) Discussion: 1) To further improve the security and dependability, the distributed data can be generated with different security parameters by using heuristics information, e.g., the energy status of the sensing node and the importance of the sensing data.
2) The security of RSK can be further improved by using multi-level secret sharing method [21] , which distinguishes the importances of different shares with same share length for RSK reconstruction. For example, more important shares are distributed to safer nodes.
3) As many data retrieval schemes propose aggregative data collection, our scheme is also able to be compatible in this situation by replacing the naive secrete sharing scheme to homomorphic secret sharing scheme [22] .
Analysis of secure and dependable storage
In this section, we analyze the performance, security and dependability properties of the proposed RepS, SSBS, and HybridS schemes. As the attack model is defined earlier, our security analysis will focus on the data that are modified or destroyed by random fault or mobile adversaries.
Performance analysis
We summarize comparisons between RepS (n-Replication), SSBS ((m, n) secret sharing) and HybridS ((m, n) enhanced secret sharing) in Table 2 . Table 3 shows quantitative performance analysis in terms of storage, communication and computation overhead. As justified in section 2.4, the communication cost is most important. We can draw the conclusion that HybridS attains the best performance owing to the communication overhead (more specifically, the length of shares) and achieves the highest level of security and dependability.
Security analysis Proposition 1.
Even if adversaries compromise data holders and resides afterwards to corrupt the data (i.e., the most advanced adversary), the sensed data can still be able to reconstruct original data upon the first request with the probability Proof. If the data are retrieved from the data holder without adversary I, the data can be reconstructed. Such combination is C m n(1−pm) . The total combinations of retrieved holders are C m n . Therefore, the probability of successfully retrieving the data upon the first request is
Proposition 2.
If majority voting is used for determining the final result, the probability that the voting result is valid in a round is
Proof. The proof is straightforward. 
Dependability analysis
Fault-tolerant:
Proposition 3. The (m, n) HybridS scheme can reconstruct original data if the number of failure nodes in n is smaller than threshold value m. The probability of guaranteeing data reconstruction in the presence of random Byzantine failure is
where p f is the probability that a node has random failure and m n.
Proof. Straightforward. Figure 1 depicts the analysis results of some (m, n) parameters.
Compromise-resilient:
Proposition 4.
Adversaries have to compromise enough nodes in the UWSNs to reveal the original data and damage the confidentiality. For the (m, n) HybridS Scheme, the adversaries have to compromise m nodes from n nodes. If the probability that one node is compromised is p c , the probability of guaranteeing data confidentiality in the presence of node compromise is
where p c is the probability that a node is compromised and m n.
Proof. Straightforward.
Coding method for checking data integrity
In previous presentations, sensor node distributes encoded data to neighbor nodes in a secure and dependable manner. The next problem that arises naturally is how to check the data integrity in a lightweight fashion. As the naive hash based scheme is not desirable and distributed public verification is required for dependability, in this section, we propose a lightweight scheme based on our summarized generic technique. 
TGLC coding method
We employ a two-granularity linear code to check distributed data integrity without original data in a lightweight manner.
Definition 1.
Intra-data linear code (Intra-code) is calculated in data using algebraic function:
where each datum x has k symbols, denoted by x i . The symbol length is f . α is a primitive number in GF (2 q ). Besides, q = f and k 2 q − 1.
Definition 2.
Inter-data linear code (Inter-code) is calculated among data using algebraic function:
where each datum y i (i ∈ [1, n]) has k symbols. The symbol length is f , and β is a primitive number in GF (2 q ). Also, q = f and n 2 q − 1.
Theorem 1.
The Intra-code's Inter-code equals Inter-code's Intra-code.
Proof. Consider data S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n , each of which has k symbols, denoted by S j = {x 1,j , x 2,j , . . . , x k,j }. The symbol length is f . α and β are primitive numbers in GF (2 q ). Besides, q = f and k, n 2 q − 1.
(1) The Inter-code of
(2) The Inter-code's Intra-code is
(5) Due to the property of field and linear coding in GF (2 q ), we have
Intra-code is calculated by data holders; Inter-code is calculated by data distributors and distributed to verifiers. For simplicity of description, we call Intra-code diGest and Inter-code Parity in the rest of the paper.
By choosing multiple α, the single Intra-code can be extended to multiple digests. Similarly, by choosing multiple β, the single Inter-code can be extended to multiple parities.
Two Granularity Linear Code used for checking data integrity has two advantages as follows: 1) The checking is in a distributed manner. The verifier who holds the parity can launch checking by requesting the digests from the data holders, and then checking the integrity equation (in Theorem 1). The distributed checking thus is possible, and is more dependable. 2) Lightweight checking. The involved communication is only digests that are much shorter than the original data or hash values. The resulting computation is only algebraic functions that are computed much faster than hashing functions, at both verifiers and holders.
TGLC based integrity checking
The steps for integrity checking are listed as follows:
(1) A distributor generates u parities using u randomly selected numbers: β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β u using eq. (2). (2) The distributor distributes u parities to u verifiers. (3) The verifiers who received the parity {P j β j } can launch data integrity checking. That is, v randomly selected numbers: α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α v as challenges and send them to distributed data holders.
(4) Each distributed data holder computes v digests using α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α v by eq. (1) and sends them back to the verifier.
(5) The verifier computes the parities of the returned digests, calculates the digests of the parity, and checks whether the equations hold:
If the v checking equations hold, the data integrity is maintained. Figure 2 depicts the generation of the parities. Implementation consideration: The Reed-Solomon codes, Secret Sharing and TGLC can all be efficiently implemented in the same Galois field library. Thus, the implementation code can share the same library. For example, Plank and Greenan et al. [23, 24] have already released fast Galois field library for arithmetic in GF (2 8 ), GF ( 2 16 ) and GF (2 32 ). 
The probability that the datum S is modified but the digest of data remains unchanged is
denoted by Pr 1 . That is,
Proof. Suppose the data S has k symbols, denoted by x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k . The symbol length is f . (In fact, we have q = f and k 2 q − 1.) If v = 1, only one digest is returned, which is generated by
(1) If only one symbol in data is changed, the digest of data will be changed. For example, suppose
(2) If two symbols are changed, the digest may be unchanged. For example, suppose x i1 and x i2 (i 1 , i 2 ∈ [1, k]) are changed to x i1 and x i2 . The total number of pairs is 2 f * 2 f , in which 2 f pairs have the digest G α (S). Because for each x i1 , there always exists an x i2 such that
That is, the digest keeps unchanged. The number of such pairs is 2 f , so the total occasions in which two symbols are modified but the digest is unchanged is C modification occasions, and the data have k symbols in total. Besides, the occasion without modification is excluded.) Therefore, the probability that data are modified but the digest is unchanged is In fact, Pr 1 can be estimated by 2 −f , because 
Proof.
According to Lemma 1, only when the number of modified symbols in data is larger than v, does the occasion that data is modified but v digests are unchanged become possible.
( 
The coefficient matrix is a Vandermonde matrix with linear independence, and dimension v. Thus, 2 f solutions exist for eq. (3). So, the probability that the v + 1 symbols are modified but the v digests remain unaltered is C v+1 k 2 f .
(2) Similarly to 1), the total occasions where the data are modified but the v digests remain unchanged is C v+1 k
Because the total modification occasions are (2 f ) k −1 (same reason as that for Lemma 1(4)), the resultant probability that the data are modified but the v digests remain unaltered is
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a secure and dependable data distributed storage scheme for in-networking stored sensing data in UWSNs. To achieve the maximum of accessible data upon retrieval, we take advantages of secret sharing and Reed-Solomon code, without loss of computational security and with low communication and storage overhead. The extensive analysis on performance, security and dependability verified that our scheme performs well even in the presence of node compromise and Byzantine failure.
Besides it remains efficient in terms of storage, communication and computation owing to shortened distributed data size.
Furthermore, we presented a generic coding method called Two Granularity Linear Code to efficiently check data integrity. It consists of Intra-code and Inter-code that can be computed commutatively. Such a property provides inner linkage of distributed data via digests and parities with small size. It can be applied to verify data integrity publicly in a distributed manner without original data. By making use of TGLC, we have thus proposed a lightweight scheme for verifying distributed data integrity. The extensive analysis has verified that the false positive of checking result is zero and the false negative vanishes exponentially with appropriate coding parameters and checking rounds.
